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COMMENTS

ADMITTING COMPUTER GENERATED
RECORDS: A PRESUMPTION OF
RELIABILITY
The American obsession with the computer is intensifying
at an astounding pace.1 Not since the invention of the automo-2
bile has a machine had so profound an impact on our lives.
1. Since 1980 the growth in the computer equipment market has been
overwhelming. One expert observes that "computers, including home, personal and office machines, are being shipped at the rate of one every eight
seconds ... almost exactly the same rate at which babies are being born in
this country." F. Fitzgerald, Keynote Address to Intech '83 Conference
(Nov. 1983), reprinted in COMPUTERS AND PEOPLE, Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 9. In
1982 there were 12 periodicals available concerning computer equipment.
In just two years, that number has exploded, with more than 46 publications
on the market now. Id. See also An Avalanche of Personal Computer
Magazines, Bus. WK., Aug. 22, 1983, at 90. For a look at the impact of computers in today's scientific, engineering, business and home markets, see
generally A Buyer's Guide to Home Computers, FORBES, Oct. 10, 1983, at 198200; Bazoia, How New Software Makes Managing Easier,Nations Bus., Oct.
1983, at 66-8 (computers can decrease production costs by enhancing interdepartmental communications and work scheduling); Chamberlin,
Technophobia v. Technomania, USA TODAY, Nov. 1983, at 50-51 (discussing
social and educational impact of computers); Hawkins, Low-Cost Computers, PopularSci., Nov. 1983 at 144-52 (small size and low prices are making home computers more affordable); Is the Real Revolution in Personal
Computers Just Beginning?,Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 1983, at 95-100 (smaller computers are becoming more affordable and powerful, acquiring capabilities
formerly found only in large computers); Schriffres, IBM Makes Its Big
Move in Home Computers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1983, at 63, 64
(low cost will cause growth of the $8 billion industry).
2. An entire body of law has grown up around the automobile. See
generally BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE (P. Kelley 3d ed.
1965). The potential applications of computer technology are seemingly
limitless. See generally United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.
1977) (routine computer analysis of drugs seized and tested across the
country used to identify possible conspiracies in illegal drug traffic);
Traxler, Using Computer Systems in Small Law Offices, 89 CASE & CoM. 26
(1984) (mini- and micro-computers can assist small law firms in maintaining client files, drafting documents, legal research, and general accounting).
Not every result of computer technology is desirable. See Freedman, The
Right of Privacy in an Age of Computer Data and Processing,13 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 1361 (1982) (computer processing storage and retrieval of information threaten individual privacy); Trubow, Fighting Off the New Technology,
10 HuM. RTS. 26 (1982) (computers permit unprecedented collection and dissemination of information which threaten personal privacy). The full range
of criminal uses of computer systems is yet unexplored. See generally R.
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Businesses, public offices, and individuals are increasingly
aware that computer systems can generate and maintain an infinite variety of records, with an efficiency and accuracy unseen
in conventional methods. 3 This technological explosion has resulted in an endless variety of mainframe computers, microcomputers and minicomputers that have revolutionized America's
4
view of electronic data processing.
Computerized record systems present significant evidentiary issues for both civil and criminal litigation. 5 Broadly
Levy, Criminal Liability for Computer Offenses and the New Wisconsin
Computer CrimesAct, 56 Wis. B. BULL. 21 (1983) (computer offenses include
unauthorized access, alteration or destruction of data bases or programs,
and theft of a program or unauthorized program copying); Comment, Some
Aspects of Theft of Computer Software, 4 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 273 (June
1982) (growth of computer use may decrease personal crime but increase
white collar crime). Some commentators have even suggested that the failure to use a computer may constitute negligence where it can be shown that
such use is widespread and a reasonable person in the same circumstances
would not have failed to use one. See Hermann, Impact of Computers on
Medical Malpractice, 5 NEW ENG. 135 (1970) (use in medicine); Petras &
Scarpelli, Computers,Medical Malpractice,and the Ghost of the T.J. Hooper,
5 RUT. J. OF COMPUTERS & THE L. 15 (1975) (use in medicine).
3. Accounting records, invoices, utility bills, summaries of customer
transactions, agents' commission balances, telephone call listings, inventories and cost comparison analyses are but a few of the commercial
records that have been adapted to electronic systems. See United States v.
Fendley, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975) (agent's commission balances); United
States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969) (summaries of auto rental
transactions); Leone v. Precision Plumbing & Heating of S. Ariz., Inc., 121
Ariz. 514, 591 P.2d 1002 (1979) (cost comparison analyses); Merrick v. United
States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968) (accounting records);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Bank of Wiggins, 358 So. 2d 714 (Miss. 1978) (parts
inventories). See also Jacobson, The Use of ComputerPrintoutsas Evidence
in Commercial Litigation,82 COM. L.J. 14 (1977) ("every type of record that
is normally made in the regular course of business"). Public offices have
also discovered varied uses for computerized records systems. See United
States v. Farris, 517 F.2d 226 (7th Cir.) (printouts of tax records), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315
N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1974) (printouts showing data used to determine assessed values for property tax); City of Seattle v. Heath, 10 Wash.
App. 949, 520 P.2d 1392 (1974) (driving records maintained by state department of motor vehicles). See generallyAnnot., 71 A.L.R. 3D 232 (1974). As to
the possible uses for personal computer systems, see infra notes 135-36 and
accompanying text.
4. See generally COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE AND HANDBOOK No. 13
(1983). R. Tocci &L. LAsKowsKi, MICRO-PROcESsoRs AND MICROCOMPUTERS
(2d ed. 1982); R. WALKER, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER SCIENCE (1981). The
availability of personal computers raises profound questions with regard to
the role educators should play in equipping our children to function in an
automated world. A good introduction to such concerns may be found in
Computers: A Kaleidoscopic View, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 103-34 (1983).
5. See generally Abelie, Evidentiary Problems Relevant to Checks and
Computers, 5 RUT. J. OF COMPUTERS & THE L. 323 (1976) (admissibility of
computer records of direct financial transactions); Bender, Computer Evidence Law; Scope and Structure, 1 COMPUTER L.J. 699 (Spring 1979) (presentation of computer records into evidence); DeHetre, Data Processing
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stated, the legal concerns over the admissibility of computer
6
generated records center on their authenticity and reliability.
For example, a computer printout is hearsay where offered to
prove the truth of the matters contained therein, unless it will fit
within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. 7 The best evidence rule, which requires the production of the original of a
writing, may become an issue where a litigant offers computer
output as the best evidence of the information stored in the
computer.8 Whether a computer record is admissible often depends, therefore, on the application of these rules and the proof
of authenticity and reliability necessary to preclude their exclusionary effect. 9
Evidence-Is It Different.?, 52 Cmi.-KENT L. REV. 567 (1976) (impact of computer evidence on litigation); Freed, Fenwick &McGonigal, Mock Trial: Admissibility of Computerized Business Records, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 206, 209
(1975) (considerations of admissibility of computer records can be a factor
in system design, tort liability, and communications regulation); Johnson, A
Guidefor the Proponentand Opponent of Computerbased Evidence, 1 CoMPUTER L.J. 667 (1979) (admissibility of computer records); North, Computer
Evidence in Illinois, 71 ILL. B.J. 590 (1983); Roberts, A Practitioner'sPrimer
on Computer Generated Evidence, 41 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 254 (1974); Tapper,
Evidence From Computers, 8 GA. L. REV. 562 (1974) (admissibility of computer printouts); Younger, ComputerPrintoutsin Evidence: Ten Objections
and How to Overcome Them, 2 LIGATION 28 (1975) (admissibility of computer printouts); Comment, Computer Print-Outsof Business Records and
Their Admissibility in New York, 31 ALB. L. REv. 61 (1967) (admissibility of
computer printouts); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 4TH 8 (1980) (admissibility of computerized private business records); Annot. 71 A.L.R. 3D 233-40 (1972) (proof of
public records stored on electronic computing equipment). This comment
does not deal with the issues surrounding computer evidence generated
specifically for purposes of litigation. For an excellent discussion of the
foundation requirements for admitting "comp-lit" evidence, as it is called,
see Comment, Guidelinesfor the Admissibility of Evidence Generated by
Computerfor Purposes of Litigation 15 U.C.D.L. REV. 951 (1982). See also
Perma Research and Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.) (computer
simulation used to demonstrate potential of automotive anti-skid device),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976); United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033,
1037-39 (2d Cir.) (computer model used to prove fraud regarding inventory
in bankruptcy action), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970); Dombroff, Demonstrative Evidence: Computer Reconstruction Techniques, 18 TRIAL 52 (1982);
Jenkins, Computer Generated Evidence Specially Prepared For Use at
Trial, 52 CHi.-KENT. L. REv. 600 (1976) (computer manipulation of evidence
for trial). The introduction of computer records also raises issues relevant
to the discovery of such evidence. See Comment, Discovery of Computerized Information, 12 CAP. U.L. REv. 71 (1982) (discussing use of computers
for discovery).
6. The authenticity and the reliability of computer records are discussed infra at notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
7. The hearsay character of computer printouts is generally conceded
whether courts admit them or not. See infra note 78.
8. See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
9. An analysis of the cases that have excluded computer generated
records is presented infra at notes 159-81 and accompanying text.
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Some courts have adopted multi-level tests for admitting
computer evidence to ensure that the computer is reliable and
that its output is trustworthy. 10 Concededly born of judicial distrust and unfamiliarity with computer technology," one may
question this guarded approach in light of the realities of modern science and business. 12 To require that the proponent establish the reliability of each step of the computer's process
before a court will even admit a computer record places a great
burden on the proponent of such evidence. The proliferation of
computers demands more workable solutions.
The evidentiary integrity of computer records now produced
depends upon the scientific reliability of today's computers.
This comment begins, therefore, with an overview of technological advances that have increased the computer's accuracy in
processing information. This comment then considers a rationale for defeating "best evidence" objections in the context of
computer output and questions the tendency of some courts to
draw artificial distinctions between conventional and computerized records for the purposes of applying the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. The comment traces the gradual move by some
courts to admit conventional private records and argues that
personal computer records should be admissible under the
same theories. Finally, this comment attempts to identify the
elements of an adequate foundation, taking into account the approaches recommended for the "best evidence" and hearsay
problems. It is urged that, in lieu of requiring extensive foundation testimony, judges take judicial notice of the presumed reliability of regularly kept computer records.
10. The most comprehensive scheme to date was proposed in Monarch
Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 156 N.J. Super. 107, 383 A.2d 475 (1977). In
Monarch, the court announced a seven-part test covering each step in the
processing of the data and required that the reliability of each step be
proved prior to admitting the computer printouts. Id. at 124-32, 383 A.2d at
484-88. The application of this approach to a wide range of cases could produce absurd results. For example, it would be ludicrous to require a retail
department store to prove up every step incident to the preparation of a
customer's computerized credit bill in a suit to collect a delinquency of $500.
11. Many commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with judicial
evaluation of the reliability of computer evidence. A few have argued that
the admissibility requirements are too lenient. See Singer, Proposed
Changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence as Applied to Computer-Generated Evidence, 7 J. OF COMPUTERS, TECH. &L. 157, 158 (1979) (federal rules

could adequately handle computer evidence, but judges must understand
the nature of this evidence); Note, A Reconsiderationof the Admissibility of
Computer Generated Evidence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 425, 437-51 (1977) (some

courts have been too lenient in light of the possibilities for unreliability).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 29-45.
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COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY

Aided by the development of the integrated circuit chip, 13
the computer has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis in recent years. As a result, a dizzying array of electronic equipment
14
is now available to both the computer specialist and novice.
These new systems are affordable, easy to operate, adaptable to
15
a wide variety of tasks, complete, and compact.
Increased operational accuracy and output reliability are inevitable accompaniments of such technological advances. 16 In
contrast to their predecessors, the computers marketed today
benefit from years of trial-and-error attempts to achieve precision. Consequently, the design and attributes of today's computers are relevant
in formulating new admissibility
17
requirements.
13. A "chip" is a mass-produced 1/8" to 3/4" piece of silicon inscribed
with tens of thousands of transistors and other circuits. COMPUTER BUYER'S

GUIDE AND HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 191. Storage media are discussed
infra at note 17.
14. See generally authorities cited supra at note 1.
15. See generally authorities cited supra at note 1.
16. See generally authorities cited supra at note 1.
17. Although "mainframe" computers were prevalent throughout the
1960s and 1970s, the trend had notably shifted to microcomputers. R. Tocci
& L. LASKOWSKI, supra note 4, at 84-90. "Mainframe" is a term generally
used to distinguish large computers from the new mini and micro models.
COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE AND HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 192.

A microcomputer is a miniaturized version of a traditional system made
possible by the development of miroprocessors. R. Tocci & L. LASKOWSKI,
supra note 4, at 89. Basically, a microprocessor is a computer subsystem
itself, exclusive of memory, input and output functions. Id. at 159-60. Ordinarily, a microprocessor is contained on a single integrated circuit "chip".
Every electronic data processing system, including the microcomputer,
is comprised of five basic components: (1) the arithmetic/logic unit (ALU),
(2) the control unit, (3) storage or memory, (4) input units, and (5) output
units. R. Tocci & L. LASKOWSKI, supra note 4, § 3.4 at 92. The ALU is half of
the computer's "brain," responsible for performing all arithmetic and logic
operations on inputted data. These operations are generally referred to as
"hardware operations" because they are the pure result of the electronic
operation of the computer and cannot be altered by programming instructions. See 14 AM. JuR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS 173, 186 (1977). Operations known

as programmable read only memories (PROMS) can be added to the hardware operations to enable the computer to perform additional specialized
tasks which cannot be altered. Id., at 187. Such features increase the overall reliability of a computer system. The control unit is the other half of the
computer's "brain." R. Tocci & L. LASKOWSKI, supra note 4, § 3.4 at 94.
Through instructions retrieved from the computer's memory, it orchestrates the operations of other units by means of timing and control signals.
Id.
Storage units or memories store groups of binary encoded data that
represent both the program which instructs the control unit, as well as the
results of the operations the ALU performs. The language a computer uses
is not complex. The most basic unit is referred to as a bit and is represented by the binary digits 0 or 1. Bits are generally stored in groups or
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The various controls, checks, and tests used in today's computers provide greater accuracy and reliability. The use of these
words to facilitate ease in processing. For convenience, a group of eight bits
is referred to as one byte, while four-bit groupings are fondly known as nibbles. Id. at 95.
Computer programs or "software," as they are often referred to, contain
the instructions which control the computer's operation. Computer programmers generally write these instructions in specialized computer languages which combine English and mathematical characters and are
identified by various acronyms. See 14 AM. JR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS 173, 188
(1977). Examples include BASIC (Beginners All-Purpose Symbolic Instruction Code), C BASIC (used in microprocessors), COBOL (Common
Business Oriented Language), FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslator) and
Pascal (named for Blaise Pascall). See COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE AND
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 191-92.
Today, both the novice and the expert can choose between thousands of
"canned software" (pre-programmed) packages designed to make the operation of a computer as simple as any other household appliance. Id. at 102.
The typical software package includes a magnetic disk or tape, as well as
user instructions, display examples, an error message glossary and a manufacturer's "hot line" number. Id. Examples of "canned" programs presently on the market include accounts payable, accounts receivable,
database (which include the error check detection systems discussed infra
at notes 18-25), general ledger, graphics, inventory, legal practice, medical
practice, payroll, spread-sheeting, tax preparation, telecommunications and
word processing. Id.
The most significant advances in storage mediums have been in the
techniques developed for microcomputers. See generally, R. Tocci & L.
LASKOWSKI, supra note 4, § 7.10, 7.11, at 281-88. Among the most familiar
innovations are the floppy magnet disks or "diskettes." Id. For storage, the
first microcomputers utilized a punched paper tape. Characters were represented by a hole for the binary digit 1 and no hole for the digit 0. This system proved slow, costly and cumbersome. See Data Storage in a Nutshell,
COMPUTERS &ELECTRONICS, July 1983, at 36-48. Recent computer technology
has produced an assortment of highly sophisticated and reliable storage
systems. IBM was the first to market the "floppy-disk" systems. A floppy or
"diskette" is an 8-inch diameter paper-thin platter coated with a magnetic
surface similar to that used on conventional magnetic tapes. A typical diskette can hold up to 246 kilobytes. Id. (A kilobyte is 1024 bytes.) See COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE & HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 191.
Input units are utilized to introduce data external to the computer into
the computer's memory. A good technical description of keyboard input devices may be found in R. Tocci &L. LASKOWSI, supranote 4, at 271-79. Output units receive data from the memory and transfer it into an intelligible
form for external use. R. WALKER, supra note 4, at 2-2. A microcomputer
ordinarily performs input and output operations through the use of a keyboard, a cathode ray tube (CRT) terminal and a high-speed printer.
A comprehensive listing of available input and output units appears in
COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE & HANDBOOK, supra note 4. Closely related to
these devices are MODEMS (Modulator/Demodulator), which are used to interface (link) the computer to a telephone line. Id. at 192. Telecommunication networks now permit input and output access to the computer from
remote locations. For example, LEXIS and WESTLAW, the computerized
legal research systems, both depend upon teleprocessing. See, The Latest
on Westlaw, Lexis, and Dialog,70 A.B.A.J. 85 (1984). An interesting use of
modems involves the concept of "telecommuting" where employees avoid
rush-hour traffic by using a remote access terminal to the company's computer to do their work at home two or three days of the week. See, It's Rush
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techniques are so widespread among manufacturers and programmers that one could presume a computer system's reliability unless proof exists that a crucial control or test was omitted
and that the omission was likely to have caused output error.
Such a presumption would shift the burden of evaluating the reliability of the computer record for the purposes of admissibility
to the record's opponent and move the forum for identifying defects from trial to discovery.
Error elimination techniques include such things as "check
edits" designed to prevent or locate and warn of input errors.
"Check edits" force the computer operator to enter commands
in a correct sequence to access a particular computer function,
require the operator to match a customer's name with the correct account number in order to process a transaction, or place
numerical limits on values that may be entered so as to identify
unreasonably high or low figures. 18 Eliminating human involvement in inputting data also prevents input errors. For example,
the innovative bar-coded pricing on foodstuffs has cut the waiting time at the supermarket checkout line in half, with an
equivalent improvement in the accuracy of the bill. 19 The use of
security measures, including such things as passwords to limit
access to the computer, restricted access to disk storage files
and careful selection of operators and technicians, further improves input integrity. 20 Input errors can also be detected by a
proofreading operation known as "echoing."'2 1 The data is actually inputted twice or "echoed" and the two versions compared
for keystroke errors. If a discrepancy is detected, the computer
22
will alert the operator.
A method known as "parity" guards against errors in the
data or the loss of data that may occur during its transfer from
one location in the computer to another, as a result of faulty
memory. 23 Memory errors can also be precluded by "redundant
Hourfor 'Telecommuting,'Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1984, at 99-102. (Two Hundred

U.S. companies are experimenting and 30 have formal programs.)
18. DeHetre, supra note 5, at 587 n.20; Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility
of Computer Generated Evidence, 52 CHr-KEN'r. L. REV. 547, 553 (1976); 14
AM. JuR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS 173, 190 (1977).
19. See Sprowl, supra note 18, at 558. Another example is the magnetic
striped credit cards that are read by machine.
20. 14 AM. Jur. 2D PROOF OF FACTS 173, 190 (1977).
DATA COMMUNICATIONS:

See also K. SHERMAN,

A USER'S GuIDE 174-75 (1981).

21. Sprowl, supra note 18, at 553.
22. Id.
23. K. SHERMAN, supra note 20, at 175-79; Sprowl, supra note 18, at 550

n.11. Basically, parity is a coding mechanism that attaches an additional
binary "bit" to each bit configuration sought to be transferred. Parity can
be either odd or even, and the computer will be instructed according to
which parity method is chosen. In an even-parity method, the value of the
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recording. '24 Basically, "redundant recording" is a technique
used to eliminate errors that might result from a scratched or
worn disk. It permits the computer to compare two versions of
the recorded information
and thereby determine the presence of
25
discrepancies.
The use of turnkey systems and expansive software testing
further reduce the probability of computer error.26 Much of the
software available today is marketed in a prepackaged or
"canned" form.2 7 All software, however, generally undergoes
extensive testing and debugging before being utilized to actually
process data. 28 A comprehensive explanation of software testing procedures is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless,
the widespread use of such techniques increases computer
reliability.
Some courts and commentators that have considered the reliability of computers identify various sources of error which al29
legedly affect the trustworthiness of any computer output.

These sources of error include equipment or "hardware" failure,
parity bit will be chosen so that the total value of "'s"in the bit configura-

tion plus the parity bit equals an even number. For example, if the bit configuration contains an odd number of "l's", 00010011, the parity value will be
1 so that the total number of "l's" in the bit configuration is an even
number, or 10010011. When the computer is programmed using an even parity method, it will detect all transmitted configurations totaling an odd
number. In this manner, any single error in the data can be ferretted out.
For further explanation of the concept of parity, see R. Tocci & L. LASKOWSKI, supra note 4, at 16-17; R. WALKER, supra note 4, at 2-33.
24. See R. Tocci & L. LASKOWSKI, supra note 4, § 7.10, at 284-86. One
drawback of magnetic storage media is the loss of the recorded information
which results if the disk or tape is lost or accidentally destroyed. The use of
a backup system can ordinary prevent these kinds of problems. Id.
25. Id.
26. A "turnkey" is a complete computer system generally composed of
all necessary hardward (equipment), software (programs), output and input units installed and fully tested. See COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE AND
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 192.
27. See supra note 17.
28. There are numerous methods of testing software. For an introduction to such techniques, see generally A. KINDRED, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTERS, DEBUGGING AND VERIFICATION OF PROGRAMS 160-64 (2d ed. 1982);
Appelbe & Pournelle, Big Projects on Small Machines, Software Engineering on Microcomputers,BYTE, Sept. 1984, at 150, 448-51.
29. American Oil Co. v. Valenti, 179 Conn. 349, 426 A.2d 305 (1979) (hardware and software errors); Grand Liquor Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 67 Ill. 2d 195, 367 N.E.2d 1238 (1977) (input, programming and
operational errors); Note, supra note 11, at 439 (environmentally induced
error hardware failure, programming, input and output errors); Note, Appropriate Foundation Requirements For Admitting Computer Printouts
Into Evidence, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 59, 75 (human and mechanical error, as
well as deliberate falsification of program or database); 14 AM. JUR. 2D
PROOF OF FACTS 173 (1977) (input integrity, hardware integrity, system security, and output integrity).
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programming mistakes and inadequacies or "software" failure,
and human operational error, including fraud. To admit a computer printout, so the argument runs, the proponent must present specific proof of the measures taken to eliminate or reduce
30
the occurrence of error from each of these sources.
Hardware malfunctions, however, are infrequent. 31 Their
possible, but unlikely, occurrence should not be allowed to diminish the evidentiary integrity of a computer's output. As already noted, error detection and correction circuits available in
most systems prevent incorrect processing of information with32
out first warning the user or taking corrective measures.
Moreover, many businesses and public offices rely on turnkey
systems. With refinements appearing daily, the mechanical reliability of computer hardware should be presumed, absent con33
trary proof.
Undetected "bugs" in a computer's software concededly can
produce inaccuracies in processed data.34 Evidence does not become inadmissible, however, simply because there is a chance
that it is incorrect. Juries and judges constantly confront testimony that may contain untruths and inaccuracies. Apart from
problems of relevance, admissibility depends upon circumstantial probabilities which demonstrate that the evidence is relia35
ble, not that the evidence cannot be refuted.
The software programs in existence today presumably contain sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability unless
30. It is upon the purported necessity of such proof that the foundation
requirements in some jurisdictions for computer records stand. See infra
notes 159-81 and accompanying text. Some courts attempt to distinguish
systems which perform calculations from those which merely store data,
holding that the former require greater scrutiny to determine their reliability. See People v. Bovio, 118 Ill.
App. 3d 836, 842, 455 N.E.2d 829, 833 (1983);
People v. Mormon, 97 Ill.
App. 3d 556, 567, 422 N.E.2d 1065, 1073 (1981), a d,
92 Ill.
2d 268, 442 N.E.2d 250 (1982). The distinction is artificial. No computer
merely "stores" data. Instead, all information entered in a computer must
be translated into binary language and then processed according to
software instructions. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31. Singer, supra note 11, at 163. Even one commentator, who has argued that the incidence of error in computer systems requires additional
proof of circumstantial reliability, freely admits that "despite its reputation
for making errors, a computer is a precise machine, substantially more accurate than people." Note, supra note 28, at 75; 14 AM. JuR. 2D PROOF OF
FACTS 173, 189 (1977).
32. Sprowl, supranote 18, at 553. See also discussion of "parity," supra
note 23.
33. Case law supports such a presumption. See infra note 103. See also
discussion of judicial notice of scientific principles, infra at notes 196-204
and accompanying text.
34. 14 AM. JuR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS 173, 188-99 (1977).
35. See infra notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text.
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other reliable circumstances compel a contrary conclusion. 36
Widespread reliance on pre-programmed software has become
an industry standard. 37 The industry applies time-tested, sophisticated, "debugging" techniques on a regular basis to newly
developed programs. 38 Moreover, fierce competition among
software manufacturers ensures that defective offerings will be
held closely in check. 39 Given these factors, it is unreasonable
to believe that the chance occurrence of software failure, without more, is sufficient to require extensive testimony concerning
the reliability of the software used.4°
The greatest source of error in any record system results
from human interaction with the information and data recorded. 41 This is true whether the error is the product of fraud
or pure mistake. 42 While no system, either manual or electronic,
and security
can boast an error-free record, the use of controls
43
measures can minimize the incidence of error.
The distrust of computerized record systems proceeds, in
part, from the unsupportable proposition that conventional techniques are less susceptible to tampering and can somehow produce more reliable results. Modern computerized record
systems, however, have markedly reduced the frequency of
human interaction with the information and data and have correspondingly minimized the introduction of human error. Moreover, computer systems have incorporated a number of controls
and security measures to ensure the integrity of the data, controls which are not available under conventional methods." It
should not follow that computer generated results may be pre36. R. WALKER, supra note 4, at 10-4.
37. See supra notes 17 and accompanying text.

38. See authorities cited supra at note 27.
39. There are literally hundreds of companies that now produce
software. See COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE & HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 120.

40. A rule of evidence that would require the computer user to find and
produce the software manufacturer or an equivalent expert at trial to attest

to the reliability of the software arguably would work a profound hardship
on the proponent. See discussion of foundation witness, infra at notes 205-

18 and accompanying text.
41. "Whenever a human serves as part of the conduit over which evidentiary information flaws, human errors will occur." Sprowl, supra note
18, at 553.

42. Commentators differ on whether the possibility of fraud in computer records affects their admissibility. CompareSinger, supra note 11, at
164-67 (noting that the possibility of tampering may effect a computer record's admissibility) with 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EviDENCE § 1001(4) [071, at 1001-97 (1983) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE] (suggesting that the issue of fraud is for the jury).
43. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
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sumed less reliable than the results of a system which requires
human interaction at each step of the process.
In addition to those factors mentioned, the high degree of
reliance that most users must place in their computer systems
provides further circumstantial guarantees that the records they
produce are trustworthy. The law should not presume that competent businesses, public servants, or for that matter, private individuals, will maintain defective systems in the pursuit of
pecuniary and other selfish interests. It should be recognized
that computer generated records carry a strong presumption of
reliability which only an equally strong showing of a lack of
trustworthiness should overcome. The application of the rules
of evidence to computer records should incorporate such a
45
presumption.
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

The Best Evidence Rule
Before the introduction of any written physical evidence at
common law, the proponent had to establish that the writing
was original, unless, through no fault of the proponent, the original was unavailable.4 The purpose of the rule was to guard
against inaccuracies, 4 7 although it has also been justified as a
guarantee against fraud.4 Whatever the underlying rationale,
most courts adopted a standard of reasonableness in their application of the rule and, therefore, required only the "best obtain49
able evidence" of a writing to be produced at trial.
45. This approach accords with FED. R. EvID. 803(6), infra at note 92;
R. EviD. 803(8), infra at note 121; and the exceptions relevant to personal computers, infra text accompanying notes 135-58.
46. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 229-35 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCoRMICK]; 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 11771282 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WIGMOREJ; Cleary and Strong, The
Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context, 51 IowA L. REV. 825 (1966).
The rule was based, in part, on the common law notion that "the best proof
FED.

that the nature of the thing will afford is only required."

MCCORMICK,

supra,§ 229, at 559 (quoting Ford v. Hopkins, 91 Eng. Rep. 250 (1700)). For
the most part, however, the "best evidence" concept has been superseded
by the requirement of producing the original of any writing. See FED. R.

Evm.

47.

1001(3).
MCCORMICK,

supranote 46, § 231, at 561.

48. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 11, at 184;

Note, supra note 11, at 431
(also suggesting that the rule was designed to facilitate interpretation of
words of art contained in writings). One commentator suggests that it is
the problems of fraud and not inaccuracies which affect computers. He
adds, however, that the issue of fraud is one of fact for the jury. 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 39, § 1001(4) [07], at 1001-97.
49. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 237, at 570. The "best obtainable evidence" approach did not ignore the production of the original writing re-
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The introduction of computer output into evidence raises
two issues related to the best evidence rule.50 First, does the
output constitute a writing?51 Assuming that it does, its relationship to the other steps of the record-generating process becomes
significant. Often the output contains data and information
culled from other documents, such as purchase orders, invoices,
bills of lading and receipts. 52 A second consideration arises:
whether the available output is the "best obtainable evidence"
of those underlying documents or of the data stored in the
53
computer.
Historically, courts have had difficulty formulating concrete
rules to distinguish "writings" from other objects. Where the
proponent seeks to prove the contents of an object which is susceptible to inaccuracies or fraud similar to traditional written
documents, the object is usually classified as a writing.54 Thus,
the definition of a writing has been expanded to incorporate
55
photographs, x-ray films, video tapes and sound recordings.
Because computer output, including printouts and CRT displays, is also arguably susceptible to inaccuracies and fraud, it
also should be classified as a "writing" for the purposes of the
rule. If it is, the proponent of the computer record must be prepared to respond to an objection that the record violates the
rule.
The voluminous writings exception has been suggested to
justify admitting computer output in lieu of underlying source
documents. 56 Where it was impractical to require the trier of
fact to dissect the thousands of source documents from which
the computer records were prepared, a few courts allowed the
introduction of computer generated summaries. 57 Cases involvquirement. It merely recognized a balance that had to be struck between
the necessity of acquiring the original and the burden of doing so. Id.
50. Where the printout itself is not introduced, but sought to be relied
on, additional problems may be encountered. For example, one court has
held that, even where a computer printout was otherwise admissible, a witness' testimony as to the printout's contents in lieu of an offer of the record
itself violated the best evidence rule. State v. Springer, 283 N.C. 627, 197
S.E.2d 530 (1973).
51. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
52. 5 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 1001(4) [07], at 1000-95.
53. See generally Note, supra note 11, at 430-35.
54. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 1182, at 421-23. See also McCORMICK,
supra note 46, § 232, at 562.
55. See FED. R. EvID. 1001.
56. 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supranote 42, § 1001(4) [071, at 1001-5. FED.
R. EvID. 1006 is the codification of the rule for federal courts. Professor Wigmore provides an excellent explanation of the rule. 4 WIGMORE, supra note
46, § 1230, at 535-46.
57. See, e.g., Transportation Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 260, 132
N.W.2d 871, 875 (1965) (record of insurance claims stored on tape); State v.
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ing a small number of underlying transactions limit this theory.
For example, the theory cannot justify the introduction of a
computer record to prove the receipt of a single payment on an
account.
A better approach to finding computer output to be the
"best evidence" of underlying transactions recognizes that a majority of businesses utilizing computerized systems, for reasons
of practicality and necessity, consider the computer's records as
permanent records of that enterprise.5 8 Underlying documents
are often routinely destroyed once the information they contain
has been entered in the system. 59 Moreover, many computers,
particularly personal models, permit "records" to be created by
direct operator input or other computer transmissions, thereby
60
eliminating the need for a paper source.
Under these circumstances, a determination that computer
generated records violate the best evidence rule would effectively destroy their usefulness. 61 The rules of evidence should
conform to the record systems widely used and relied upon.
Therefore, where it can be shown that the computer record is
relied upon as the only permanent record, the best evidence
concerns should be considered satisfied.
The Federal Rules of Evidence present the most well-reasoned solution. 62 The plain language of Rule 1001 demonstrates
congressional awareness of the issues surrounding computer
generated evidence. 63 Subsection (1) of Rule 1001 defines a
Kane, 23 Wash. App. 107, 112, 594 P.2d 1357, 1360 (1979) (record of bank accounts stored on tape).

58. See, e.g., Brandon v. Indiana, 272 Ind. 92, 396 N.E.2d 365 (1979); State
v. Staley, 37 N.C. App. 18, 245 S.E.2d 110 (1978). This approach is also suggested by Professor Weinstein, 5 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 42,
§ 1001(4) [07], at 1001-95.
59. Singer, supra note 11, at 185. "Depending on the exigencies of the
business, documents from which information to feed a computer system is
obtained may be destroyed in the ordinary course of that business." Id.
60. Id. "On-line" systems permit the computer operator to input data by
viewing a CRT screen and merely typing in the relevant information. Accordingly, in many businesses phone orders are regularly received by a
computer operator who "keys in" the purchase information. No written record of the transaction is ever made. Advances in teleprocessing now permit
a remote computer system to transfer data to another. See supranote 17.
61. See King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393
(Miss. 1969) (absent some form of output, computer records are "unavailable and useless").
62. FED. R. EviD. 1001-1004. Rule 1002 is the original document rule expanded to include recordings and photographs. It provides, in pertinent
part: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress." Id.
63. The advisory committee's notes to the federal rules point out that
the technological advances in information processing made it necessary to
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"writing" as consisting of "letters, words, or numbers, or their
equivalent, set down by ... magnetic impulse, mechanical or

electronic recording, or other form of data compilation. '64 Subsection (3) of Rule 1001 expressly provides that "if data are
stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect data accurately, is an
original. '65 The combined application of 1001(1) and 1001(3)
should be sufficient in cases involving business or personal computers to show that the computer output constitutes a writing
and, if it accurately reflects the data stored in the computer,6 6 is
67
the "best evidence" of that data.
Federal Rule 1005 provides that public records "including
data compilations in any form, if otherwise admissible, may be
proved by copy, certifled as correct in accordance with Rule 902
expand the definition of "writings" to include computer output. Advisory
Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1001(1), 56 F.R.D. 183,
341-42 (1972). Additionally, the committee indicates that considerations of
practicality and common usage require that a computer printout constitute
an "original" for the purpose of applying Rule 1002. Id.
64. FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).
65. FED. R. EViD. 1001(3). It is interesting to note that the phrase, "other
output readable by sight," could be used to include the CRT display of an
"on-line" computer system. This could be helpful in a case where a party,
having brought its CRT terminal into the courtroom and connected it by
means of a telephone line to its central computer network, would seek to
introduce the information displayed on the screen into evidence. Admittedly cumbersome, the technology nevertheless exists to create such an exhibit. Telecommunications and on-line systems are briefly discussed supra
at note 17.
66. Under Rule 1001(3), a determination that the computer printout is
an original writing is incomplete unless the printout is shown to accurately
reflect the data stored in the computer. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3). Generally, if
a foundation adequate to preclude the effect of the hearsay rule is established for the computer printout, there should be no difficulty in finding sufficient accuracy to exist under the rule. See infra notes 159-218 and
accompanying text.
67. As a practical matter, liberalized discovery procedures in most jurisdictions may remove the reason for the rule altogether. See Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1001. But see Singer, supra
note 11, at 184-92, recommending that Federal Rules 1001-1006 be changed to
require the computer process that generated the proffered evidence satisfy
the elements of the commentator's proposed Federal Rule 901(c) and that
the proponent of the computer evidence make available for examination
(1) the data, (2) the computer program(s), and (3) documentation thereof.
Id. at 189. This proposal is unacceptable for two reasons. First, it attempts
to engraft a voluminous test for the authenticity and reliability of computer
output onto the best evidence rule, a change which is both unnecessary and
unsupported in law. (The particulars of the proposed Rule 901(c) are discussed infra at notes 188-90 and accompanying text.) Second, the requirements that the data and programs be made available for examination are
unnecessary to establish the accuracy of the printouts (see supra notes 2945 and accompanying text) and duplicative of the discovery procedures
available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2736.

Computer Generated Records

1984]

or testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with
the original." 68 Public records are treated differently than private business records due to the consequences which would at69
tend their removal from the office where they are kept.
Computerized public records, as long as they are properly certified, should be considered the best obtainable evidence of the
events recorded.
States have widely adopted rules similar to the federal
rules, but by no means is the adoption universal. 70 A majority of
states have enacted provisions that provide for the admission of
computer printouts as original writings either by express language or by strong analogy. 7 ' Generally, the approaches have
been confined to the context of records prepared in the regular
course of business, voluminous records exceptions, or certifica72
tion of public records.
The Hearsay Rule
Hearsay has been defined as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
7' 3
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Admission of written hearsay is objectionable because it deprives litigants of the opportunity to test the evidence by crossexamination.7 4 The use of hearsay in criminal prosecutions may
68.

FED.

R. EviD. 1005. Rule 902 is discussed infra at note 133.

69. See generally4 WIGMORE, supra note 46, §§ 1215-1228, at 496-534. McCORMICK, supra note 46, § 204, at 574-75.
70. See generally WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 1001 [02], at
1001-99 - 1001-03; § 1002 [05], at 1002-18 - 1002-23; 1003 [04], at 1003-16 - 1003-19;
1004 [021, at 1004-31 - 1004-34.
71. For an excellent discussion of the state statutory treatment of the
best evidence rule as it relates to computer evidence, see Note, supra note
11, at 434-36.
72. See Note, supra note. 11, at 434-36. For example, an Illinois statute
provides that microfilm or computer printout copies of the records of marriage, dissolution of marriage, and declaration of invalidity of marriage will
be considered the original of those records for all purposes. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 40, § 902 (1983).
73. FED. R. EvID. 801(c). Used in this context, a "statement" included
oral and written assertions, as well as nonverbal assertive conduct. FED. R.
Ev.D. 801(a).
For other definitions of hearsay, see CAL. EviD. CODE
§ 1200(a) (West 1982); MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 246, at 584; 5 WIGMORE,
supra note 46, § 1362, at 3; Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and
Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 768-69 (1961); Wheaton, What is
Hearsay?, 46 IowA L. REV. 207, 210-11 (1961).
74. See Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Evidence, 56
F.R.D. 183, 288-89 (1972); MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 245, at 581-84 (citing
the personal presence of a witness in court and the significance of testimony given under oath as additional reasons for refusing to admit hearsay).
But see 5 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 1362, at 3 (suggesting that the oath requirement is incidental and unimportant). For additional materials on the
reasons for the hearsay rule, see generally Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
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also violate the defendant's constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against him.75 Where, however, an out-of-court declaration carries certain circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, courts will admit the evidence despite its hearsay
character.7 6 These circumstantial guarantees form the basis for
the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.7 7
To the extent offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, computer output is hearsay. 78 Its admissibility
the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 192-93 (1948);
Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974); Note,
supra note 11, at 426.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The precise relationship between the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the hearsay rule has not been
well defined. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (holding that
although they may overlap, the confrontation clause is not a codification of
hearsay rules). For the most part, however, business and public records
have withstood the challenge that their admission would violate the purposes of the clause. See United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.)
(admission of bill of lading under federal business records exception did
not violate confrontation clause), cert. denied,401 U.S. 980, reh'g denied, 402
U.S. 966 (1971); Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.) (introduction of certified
public record did not deny accused's right of confrontation), affid, 385 U.S.
554 (1965); State v. Finkley, 6 Wash. App. 278, 492 P.2d 222 (1972) (admission
of hospital's medical record under UBREA did not violate right to confront
witnesses). But see State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St. 2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348, overruled, 67 Ohio St. 2d 405, 423 N.E.2d 1122 (1967) (admission of hospital
records under UBREA held to have violated confrontation clause).
76. See Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Evidence, 56
F.R.D. 183, 293-99 (1972).
77. Id. But cf. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 325, at 751. Dean McCormick argues that many of the hearsay exceptions are actually ineffective in
establishing the reliability of the out-of-court statement. Id.
78. For various uses of computer records constituting hearsay, see Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980) (as evidence of insolvency,
computer summary of trading activity by bankrupt commodities investment firm); United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.) (printouts from
computer retrieval system of drug evidence introduced to establish chain of
conspiracy), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); United States v. Fendley, 522
F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975) (life insurance company's computer sheets showing
total unearned commission advances to agent offered as evidence of misappropriation of employer's funds); United States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889
(9th Cir. 1969) (auto rental company's computerized records to prove allegedly stolen vehicle was not rented); Allen v. State of Indiana, 439 N.E.2d 615
(Ind. 1982) (computer printouts of vehicle registration used as evidence of
identity in criminal prosecution); Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Genser, 156 N.J. Super. 107, 383 A.2d 475 (1977) (to prove account in default
in mortgage foreclosure, bank's computer records reflecting account transactions); Grand Liquor Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 67 Il. 2d 195, 367
N.E.2d 1238 (1977) (computerized records used to assess sales tax deficiency against retailer); Estate of Buddeke v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 49 Ill. App. 3d 431, 364 N.E.2d 446 (1977) (computer printouts of
amounts allegedly due hospital not allowed as evidence). See also Annot., 7
A.L.R. 4th 8 (1980) (admissibility of computerized private business
records); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 3d 232 (1974) (proof of public records kept or
stored on electronic computing equipment). A computer printout should
not, however, be considered hearsay where it is offered for a purpose other
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depends, in part, therefore, on whether the printout qualifies
under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 79 For example,
one court held that a corporation's computerized ledger sheets
introduced by opposing counsel were admissible against the
corporation as admissions by a party opponent. 80 Computer
generated evidence may also qualify as a past recollection recorded. 81 Primarily, though, a proponent should seek to intro82
duce computer printouts under a form of the business records
than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., for the limited purpose of

circumstantially showing the probable inferences that may be drawn from
the printout or to show the effect on the reader. McCoRMIcK, supra note 46,
§ 249, at 589. Cf. Scholle v. Cuban-Venezuelan-Oil Voting Trust, 285 F.2d 318,
321 (2d Cir. 1960).
79. Jacobson, supra note 3, at 14 n.2; Singer, supra note 11, at 176; Note,
supra note 29, at 66.
80. Ferris v. Polycast Tech. Corp., 180 Conn. 199, 429 A.2d 850 (1980). See
also Leone v. Precision Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 121 Ariz. 514, 591 P.2d 1002
(1979) (admission is admissible regardless of reliability). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an admission by a party-opponent is treated as a
nonhearsay statement rather than an exception to the hearsay rule. See
FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (A). It should be recognized that where the computer printout contains admissions, but does not constitute an admission
itself, a double hearsay problem may exist. In such a case, both the
printout and the out-of-court statements it contains are hearsay and both
must be qualified under a recognized exception before the printout can be
admitted. The concept of "double hearsay" is explained in Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REV. 276, 296-99 (1961).
81. Note, supra note 29, at 66 (citing Laughlin, Business Entries and the
Like, 46 IowA L. REV. 276, 278 (1961)). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
a past recorded recollection is not excluded by the hearsay rule if it is
a memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollections to enable
him to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his memory and
to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum may
be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
offered by an adverse party.
FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (emphasis added). As a practical matter, the use of
this exception essentially forecloses the opportunity to have the printout
itself admitted. This could prove harmful where recitation of large amounts
of seemingly unrelated data would merely confuse a jury or where the credibility of the reading witness might negatively impact on the veracity of the
printout.
82. For cases that looked to the Commonwealth Fund Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1732, to determine the admissibility of computer records, see United
States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974); United States v. Fendley, 552 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
839 (1972); United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970); Olympic Ins.
Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969); D & H Auto Parts v.
Ford Mktg. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 548 (D.C.N.Y. 1973); United States v. DeGeorgia,
420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969). For those decisions applying Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6), see United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Jones, 554
F.2d 251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866 (1977); United States v. Scholle,
553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); United States v.
Verlin, 466 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1979). For those decisions under a form
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or public records exceptions. 83
The Business Records Exceptions
At common law, two distinct doctrines, the "shop-book
rule" 84 and the "regular entries rule"8 5 provided exceptions for
the admission of business records. The "shop-book rule" permitted the introduction into evidence of books of a party who
was not available to testify at trial provided the proponent first
established a proper foundation for the admission of the
books. 86 The "regular entries" exception permitted the admission of a record if it contained original entries produced in the
regular course of business so long as the recorder was unavailable to testify. Someone with personal knowledge of the source
of information must have made the entries at or near the time of
87
the transaction.
Underlying these exceptions was the assumption that business records contained an unusual degree of circumstantial reliability evidenced by their systematic preparation, the high
degree of reliance the businesses themselves placed on their
records, and the duty of the employees to make accurate records
as a condition to their continued successful employment. 88 Although dissatisfaction with the limitations of the common law
approach ultimately led to the development of statutory excepof the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, see Merrick v. United
States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968); American Oil Co. v.
Valenti, 179 Conn. 349, 426 A.2d 305 (1980); Missouri Valley Walnut Co. v.
Snider, 569 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1976); Union Elec. Co. v. Mansion House Center
N. Redev. Co., 494 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. 1973); Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Hyatt, 195
Neb. 596, 239 N.W.2d 782 (1976); State v. Watson, 192 Neb. 44, 218 N.W.2d 904
(1974); Transportation Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871

(1965); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Golde, 190 N.W.2d 752 (N.D. 1972); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen, 138 Vt. 84, 413 A.2d 122 (1980); State v.
Kane, 23 Wash. App. 107, 594 P.2d 1357 (1979); State v. Bradley, 17 Wash.

App. 916, 567 P.2d 650 (1977); City of Seattle v. Heath, 10 Wash. App. 949, 520
P.2d 1392 (1974).

83. See infra notes 120-34.
84. See Radtke v. Taylor, 105 Or. 559, 210 P. 863 (1922) (contains a good
analysis of the origin and evolution of the English common law rule); MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 305, at 717-19; 4 WEINSTEiN's EVIDENCE, supra note
42, § 803(6) [01], at 803-148; Business Entries in Mississippi 16 Miss. L.J. 266
(1944) (dated but good history of the rule in Mississippi).

85. See 4WEINSTEiN's EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 803(6) [01], at 803-148; 5
WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 1518, at 426-30.
86. The rule was based, in part, on necessity and convenience, primarily
because the party would not have been allowed to testify in his own behalf.
MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 394, at 178.
87. For a good explanation of the elements of the regular entries exception, see Note, supra note 29, at 67.
88. Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence, supra
note 74, Rule 803(6). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 306, at 720.
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tions,89 the rationale remained undisturbed. 90
In federal courts the Commonwealth Fund Act 9 1 governed
the admission of business records until 1975, when Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.9 2 Rule 803(6) specifically
covers the admission of business records as an exception to the
hearsay rule. 93 Rule 803(6) embodies the rationale of the common law business records exceptions but also adds language
94
designed to reflect the realities of modern record-keeping.
The present formula discards the requirement that records
be prepared in a true business setting in favor of admitting
89. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
90. Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence, supra
note 74, Rule 803(6). 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 803(6), at
803-38.

91. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1936). A study of the law of evidence completed by
the Legal Research Committee of the New York Commonwealth Fund in
1927 produced the first major legislation concerning the admission of business records. Professor Edmund Morgan chaired the committee whose distinguished members included, among others, Professor John Wigmore. 4
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 803(b), at 803-37. The proposed act
provided as follows:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
occurrence, or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act,
transaction, occurrence, or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was
made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular
course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the
time of such action, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such
writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant
or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its
admissibility. The term business shall include business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind.
E. MORGAN, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM 63

(1927). The New York legislature adopted the proposed statute intact that

year, and Congress soon followed by enacting an identical provision in 1936
for use in federal courts. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, 803(G) at
803-37.
92. See Note, supra note 29, at 69.
93. The text of Rule 803(6) is as follows:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of the information or the method or circumstances or preparationindicate lack
of trustworthiness. The term 'business' as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (emphasis added). See infra note 97 (data compilation)
and note 103 (lack of trustworthiness).
94.

See generally STAFF

2D SEss., REPORT ON FED. R.
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EvID.,

No.

93-1299 (Oct. 1974).

93

CONG.,
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records made pursuant to a "regularly conducted activity. ' 95 To
achieve this result, the rule defines "business" to include "business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. '96 This provision appears sufficiently broad to encompass the records that
clubs, schools, churches and private individuals regularly
maintain.
The expression "data compilation" was added to include
records maintained in a computer within the types of records
admissible under Rule 803(6). 97 The change codified judicial
recognition that computer records are admissible under a business records exception. 98 It is significant that the rule prescribed no different requirements of circumstantial
trustworthiness for data compilations than it did for conventional records.99 The failure of Congress to make such a distinction implies a legislative determination that regularly
maintained computer records are as reliable as any other business records.
How much evidence of reliability must be shown to admit a
computer record under the business records exception is a matter over which judges regularly disagree. 10 0 A fundamental distinction may be drawn, however, between proving the accuracy
of computer output and demonstrating its circumstantial reliability for the purpose of negating the hearsay rule. 1 1 The for95.

FED.

R. Evm. 803(6). The change was made to include the regularly

kept records of those who would not fall within the traditional definition of
a business. See REPORT ON FED. R. EvID., supra note 94, at 14.
96. This language is nearly identical to that used in the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. Compare supra note 93 with infra note 110.
97. Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 803, supra note 74. See also 4
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, at 803(6), 803-41. The expression
"data compilation" was copied from Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
98. See supra note 82.
99. FED. R. E vD. 803(6) does not distinguish between the circumstantial
reliability of memoranda, reports, records or data compilations. All are
equally admissible to the extent that they qualify as records of a regularly
conducted activity. See supra note 82.
100. Compare supra note 99 with infra notes 159-81 and accompanying
text.
101. Accuracy is generally defined as "freedom from error" while reliability is no more than an "implied assurance based upon faith and experience"

that the thing will not fail.

WEBSTER'S SEVENTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

7,

724 (1971). "It is too late in the day to insist that evidence derived from a
computer should be kept from a jury because it is 'mysterious and remote
from common experience."' Commonwealth v. Hogan, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 236,
243 n.13, 387 N.E.2d 158, 167 n.13, affd, 379 Mass. 190, 396 N.E.2d 978 (1979). "'
IT] he scientific reliability of such machines [electronic computers 1, in light
of their general use and the general reliance of the business world on them,
can scarcely be questioned.'" Id. (quoting King v. State ex rel. Murdock
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mer affects the weight to which evidence is entitled while the
latter determines only its admissibility. 102 It is one thing to require a proponent to show the probable integrity of proffered evidence; it is quite another to refuse to admit the evidence unless
its contents are established as facts. The language of the business records exceptions are instructive on this issue.
A record of a regularly conducted activity is admissible
under Federal Rule 803(6) "unless the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness."10 3 Thus, to make computer records inadmissible under this rule, courts have held that the opponent must
raise specific, supported objections. 1° 4 The mere failure of the
Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 1969) (quoting with approval
§ 609 (5th ed. Supp. 1968)).

JONES, EVIDENCE

102. See, e.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.) (failure of
proponent of computer evidence to present evidence as to input controls,
test for computer's accuracy, affect weight, not admissibility), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 940 (1977); Union Elec. Co. v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co.,
494 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. 1973) (objection as to accuracy of computer cards held
to affect weight not admissibility). "Given the complexity of modern institutions one cannot expect routine record-keeping to be completely errorfree. Where actual error is suspected the challenge should be to the accuracy of the business record, not to its admissibility." State v. Ben-Neth, 34
Wash. App. 600, 633 P.2d 156, 158-59 n.2 (1979). Courts have taken a similar
approach regarding the accuracy of other scientific processes. See City of
Highland v. Pollution Control Bd., 66 Ill.
App. 3d 143, 383 N.E.2d 692 (1978)
(lack of scientific evidence of accuracy of EPA sound pressure level tests
went to weight, not admissibility); People v. Abdailah, 82 ll. App. 2d 312, 226
N.E.2d 408 (1967) (failure to prove accuracy of speed measuring device will
affect weight of evidence); MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 210, at 515; Annot.,
49 A.L.R. 2d 460 (1955) (discussion of nroof by means of radar and photographic devices). See also discussion L iudicial notice of scientific reliability of mechanical devices, infra at note. 196-204 and accompanying text.
103. FED. R. EvD. 803(6). See supra. )te 93. The Commonwealth Fund
Committee's proposed act and former 28 U.S.C. § 1732 did not include such a
provision. See supra note 91. Instead, those statutes expressly provided
that the circumstances surrounding the making of the record were to affect
only the weight to be given the evidence and not its admissibility. Such a
statutory approach would seemingly foreclose any argument that, where
records are maintained in a computer, additional proof of the computer's
reliability is necessary to make the printouts admissible. While the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the printouts may affect the weight
to which they are entitled, the statute expressly forbids consideration of
such factors in determining admissibility. But see Illinois' treatment of
computer records under such a business records exception discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 112-17.
With regard to circumstances indicating a lack of trustworthiness, the
courts have generally been concerned with reports that were prepared in
anticipation of litigation. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (signed
statement of deceased railroad employees); Gilmour v. Strescon, Ind., Inc.,
66 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Pa.) (crane operators report to employer regarding accident), affid, 521 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1975).
104. Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980) (computer records
held admissible absent specific objection to accuracy). Accord United
States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975) (to make computer records
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proponent to identify the computer model or certify its reliabil05
ity are not circumstances indicating a lack of trustworthiness.1
This approach is consistent with the unusual degree of reliability accorded records made in the regular course of business' 0 6
and the strong presumption of reliability of computer generated
0 7
records.
A majority of states have adopted a form of either Federal
Rule 803(6)108 or the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
(UBREA)109 In contrast to the federal approach, the UBREA
expressly requires the judge to determine if, in his opinion, the
"sources of information, method and time of preparation [of the
business record] were such as to justify its admission." 110 This
inadmissible, opponent must raise specific, supported objections); United
States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969) (mechanical accuracy of
computer need not to be shown to admit printouts).
105. United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982).
106. E.g., Olympic Ins. Co. v. Harrison Inc., 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969)
(computer printouts which qualify as business records have a "prima facie
aura of reliability").
107. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
108. Twenty-six states have adopted 803(6) substantially intact or with
only minor revisions. They include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. 1
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, at T-1.
109. The following states utilize the UBREA: California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee. See Note, supra note 29, at 69 n.60.
110. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act eliminated the
Committee's proposal that the circumstances surrounding the making of
the record, apart from the "regular course of business" concept, should be
addressed to weight, not admissibility. See supra note 91. It provides as
follows:
An Act to make uniform the use of business records as evidence:
Section 1. (Definition.) The term 'business' shall include every
kind of business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
Section 2. (Business Records.) A record of an act, condition or
event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian
or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its
preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or
near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the
Court, the sources of information, method and time or preparation were
such as to justify its admission.
Section 3. (Uniformity of Interpretation.) This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Section 4. (Short Title.) This Act may be cited as the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act.
9A U.L.A. 506 (1965).
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi have looked to the common law business exceptions in deciding whether to admit computer generated records. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 439 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. 1982); Brown v.
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provision turns the determination of the circumstantial reliability of regularly kept computerized business records on its head.
It allows the exclusion of records where the trustworthiness of
any element of their preparation is not conclusively
established."'
Jurisdictions that have developed their own statute have
taken an equally questionable approach. Illinois is a prime example. In Illinois, two rules govern the admission of regularly
kept business records, one for civil matters and the other for
criminal." 2 Both contain the admonition that all circumstances
of the making of the record other than its regular preparation
"may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its
113
admissibility."
Nevertheless, when the admissibility of computer generated
records is in issue, Illinois courts have consistently disregarded
the express language of the statutory exceptions without explanation. Thus, Illinois courts have held computer records inadmissible because the proponent failed to identify the computer
model or failed to present specific evidence as to the sources of
information or the time and method of preparation." 4 In fact,
this "test" for computer record admissibility strongly resembles
5
the requirements of the UBREA."
Illinois applies its own business records exception when
considering the admissibility of conventional business records
but applies a different exception when confronted with business
records generated by the computer. This "double standard"
renders meaningless the rationale underlying the business
Commonwealth, 440 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Hodgeson, 305
So.2d 421 (La. 1975); McKee v. Mississippi Bank & Trust Co., 376 So.2d 654
(Miss. 1979).
111. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
112. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 236 (1983) (civil cases) and ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 115-5 (1983) (criminal cases).

113. Id.
114. See Grand Liquor Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 67 Ill. 2d 195,
367 N.E.2d 1238 (1977) (failure to present evidence as to input procedures,

programming and operation of computer held to affect admissibility of computer records); People v. Bovio, 118 Ill. App. 3d 836, 455 N.E.2d 829 (1983)

(failure to demonstrate that computer was standard and how computer record was prepared went to admissibility); Estate of Buddeke v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 49 Ill. App. 3d 431, 364 N.E.2d 446 (1977) (reversible error

for judge to admit computer printout without testimony as to its preparation); Department of Mental Health v. Beil, 44 Ill. App. 3d 402, 357 N.E.2d 875
(1976) (computer printouts qualified as business records held inadmissible
where no evidence presented as to sources of information, time and method
of preparation).
115. Compare supra note 110 with Grand Liquor Co., Inc, v. Department
of Revenue, 67 111. 2d 195, 367 N.E.2d 1238 (1977).
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records exception. 116 It draws an artificial distinction between
conventional and computerized records. 1 7 Moreover, it carries
the potential of transforming rulings on the admissibility of
computer evidence into mini-trials where the court hears extrinsic testimony regarding every phase of the records' production.
The burden imposed upon the litigants and the courts far outweighs the minimal gains in circumstantial reliability.
The presumption of trustworthiness available under Federal Rule 803(6) avoids the foregoing problems. 18 It shifts the
inquiry from the courtroom to pre-trial discovery. 1 19 Moreover,
the federal rule focuses the determination of admissibility upon
the specific factors that could have affected output reliability,
rather than indulge a series of hypotheticals. Jurisdictions following the Illinois approach should re-examine their treatment
of computerized business records taking into account the presumption of trustworthiness that FRE 803(6) provides.
Public Records

Computerized records systems are widely used in public offices and agencies. 12 Where these records are introduced into
evidence, they must also qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule. 121 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) covers the admission of public records, including "data compilations.' ' 22 The
116. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.

117. Even though the scrivener's quill pens in original entry books
have been replaced by magnetic tapes, microfiche fies and computer
printouts, the theory behind the reliability of regularly kept business
records remains the same and computer generated evidence is no less
reliable than original entry books provided a proper foundation is laid.
Brandon v. State, 272 Ind. 92, 99, 396 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1979).
118. See supra note 93.
119. See supra note 67.
120. The earlier computers were developed specifically for government

use. See supra note 4. Their applications include illegal drug analysis
records, United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 940 (1977); driving records, City of Seattle v. Heath, 10 Wash. App. 949,
520 P.2d 1392 (1974); jury selection, Hackney v. United States, 389 A.2d 1336

(D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132; income tax filings, United States v.

Farris, 517 F.2d 226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); and tax assessments, Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358
N.Y.S.2d 367 (1974).
121. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
122. Rule 803(8) provides as follows:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth
(A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions
and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
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rule allows admission of reports of a public office or agency or of
matters observed by a public officer or employee, other than a
123
law enforcement official.
Public records are presumed reliable because public officials are under a duty to prepare accurate records and the inconvenience and expense that would result from routinely
requiring such officials to testify as to the trustworthiness of
these records. 124 The routine preparation of official records and
the daily reliance of public employees on them add additional
guarantees of trustworthiness. 125 Yet, despite these assurances
of reliability, several commentators have urged that the reasons
for admitting manually prepared public records cannot logically
support the admission of official records maintained in a
126
computer.
This argument is no more sound than the theories advanced
to justify a distinction between conventional and computerized
business records. 127 No basis exists for the propositions that
computers increase the incidence of human error or more effectively mask its presence in public recordkeeping 28 Moreover,
case law supports a contrary conclusion.
In United States v. Orozco, 2 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that computer records of automobile license numbers prepared by border authorities were
qualified for admission under Rule 803(8) where nothing in their
preparation indicated a lack of trustworthiness. 30 In United
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED.

R.

EVID.

803(8).

123. Id. In the latter case, the observer must also have been under a duty
imposed by law to observe and to report his observations. Id. There is no
requirement that the records have been made pursuant to some regularly
conducted activity. Professor Weinstein notes that the "reliance of public
offices on electronic computers justifies the admission of data compilations
prepared or stored in public offices on the same basis of assumed authenticity as [conventionally] prepared records." 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 42, § 901(b) (7) [011, at 901-101. Under this exception, public records are
admissible only in criminal cases where the government is not a defendant
but may be excluded if the "sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness." This phrase is identical to the exclusionary clause in 803(6). See supranotes 103-07 and accompanying text.
124. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 803(8) [01], at 803-171.
125. 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 901(b) (7) [01], at 901-101.
126. Singer, supra note 11, at 181-84; Note, supranote 11, at 449-50.
127. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 41-44.
129. 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1979).

130. Id.
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3 ' the United States
States v. Farris,'
Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the government's certified and regularly prepared computer printouts of the defendant's tax records
were self-authenticating under Rule 902 and admissible, without
more, to prove that the records contained no filing for the tax
years in question. 13 2 Under the reasoning of these decisions,
computer generated public records are admissible unless their
certification is improper 133 or specific circumstances indicate a
lack of trustworthiness. 1 3

Private Records
If current market trends are indicative, the personal computer will be a standard household appliance by 1990.135 As

users become more familiar with available equipment and
software, as well as more sophisticated in applying their systems to personal pursuits, the use of privately generated computer records in litigation will increase. Although few users are
likely to consider it, whether courts will admit personal computer records may ultimately affect the value of using a personal
136
computer to produce and store personal records.
131. 517 F.2d 226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
132. Id. at 228. Rule 803(10) covers the situation where the absence of an
entry in a public record is sought to be proved. It provides as follows:
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and
preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search
failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or
entry.
FED. R. Evm. 803(10). This rule is essentially the counterpart of FED. R.
EVID. 803(7) which covers the absence of an entry in business records. Rule
803(10) does not, however, provide the judge with an opportunity to exclude
the evidence if the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the
records indicated a lack of trustworthiness. CompareFED. R. EvmD. 803(10)
with supra note 93.

133. FED. R. Ev. 902(4) essentially provides that "extrinsic evidence of
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with
respect to ... (4) certified copies of public records." Id.

134. This requires the opponent to raise specific objections to reliability.
See supra note 104.
135. See Is 'the Real Revolution' in Personal Computers Just Beginning?,

Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 1983, at 95-100. One source estimates that IBM alone will
build 2 million personal computers in 1984. PersonalComputers.- And the
Winner is IBM, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1983, at 76.
136. For example, in an action to recover income tax allegedly overpaid, a
ruling that private tax records prepared on a personal computer are inadmissible would seriously diminish the value of owning and using such a
system.
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Personal records, even when regularly prepared, were traditionally considered not to constitute "business records" within
13 7
the meaning of the shopbook or regular entries exceptions.
Private memoranda, diaries and checkstubs were therefore generally excluded as hearsay, 138 though in some cases they were
permitted to refresh the memory of a witness 139 or were admissible as admissions or declarations against interest. 140 Underlying the reasons for their inadmissibility was the conclusion that
their inherent self-serving character demonstrated an overall
14 1
lack of trustworthiness.
Recent decisions signal judicial willingness to find personal
records reliable if they are regularly kept and systematically
prepared. In Sabatino v. Curtiss National Bank of Miami
Springs,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a decedent's checkbook was admissible under the
Federal Business Records Act 43 to prove the absence of an entry therein. Noting that federal courts follow a liberal policy regarding admissibility,'" the court found that "private records, if
kept regularly and if incidental to some personal business pursuits" could be introduced under the federal business records
45
exception.
The language of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) is broad
enough to encompass personal records made pursuant to a "regularly conducted activity."'146 The expression "business" expressly includes "callings of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit."' 47 In Keogh v. Commissioner,148 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a
diary regularly kept by the taxpayer's coworker was admissible
under FRE 803(6) to prove the amount of income received from
tips. The court cited, with authority, Professor Weinstein's observation that "a housekeeper's records kept neatly and accu137. For a history of the treatment of personal records, see Comment,
Admissibility of Personal Checking Records, 1970 U.I.L.F. 288, 289 (1970).
138. 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence §§ 867-69 (1964).
139. Id., § 869, at 971.
140. See Comment, supra note 137, at 290.

141. Professor Laughlin points out, however, that if "being self-serving
rendered records inadmissible, any rule admitting regular entries would
lose much of its value." Laughlin, supra note 80, at 285. Thus, the mere
recognition that personal records may be self-serving does not make them
less reliable than any other regularly kept records.
142. 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1057 (1970).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1966). See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
144. Sabatino, 415 F.2d at 635-36.

145. Id. at 636.
146. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
147. See text accompanying supra note 96.
148. 713 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1983).
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rately for purposes of balancing bank statements, keeping strict
budgets and preparing tax returns could qualify under the
1 49
statute."'
Federal Rule 803(6) should admit personal records generated by a computer if kept in the course of a regular conducted
activity and if it was the regular practice of that person to keep
such a record, unless other circumstances demonstrate a lack of
trustworthiness. 5 0 In view of the strong presumption of reliability of computer records, the mere fact that the information is
entered in a personal computer rather than a checkbook or diary
does not demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness. 151 The high degree of reliance personal computer users will place in their
records adds assurance that the information the records contain
is reliable.
One criticism of this approach is that the inexperience of
most personal computer owners will countermand any indicia of
reliability that the meticulous preparation of such records creates.' 5 2 While unfamiliarity with a particular system may in-

crease the opportunity for error, this potential infirmity should
not be transformed into a per se rule of inadmissibility. The
case law construing Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) makes
clear that such considerations are irrelevant to admissibility unless raised by specific, supported objections. 5 3 Thus, the fact
that a personal computer user is a novice is not necessarily a
circumstance indicating a lack of trustworthiness.
Personal computer generated records might also be admissible under Federal Rule 803(5) as a past recorded recollection. 15 4 This exception, however, requires the in-court
testimony of the record's preparer before the record is admissible. Additionally, even if the record is admitted, only its contents are read into the record. The output itself is not an
155
exhibit.
149. Id. at 499 (quoting 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42,
§ 803(6) [03], at 803-155).
150. Dean McCormick notes that the regularity and continuity of systematic record preparation alone furnishes an unusual reliability. See MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 306, at 720.
151. For the arguments supporting the presumptive trustworthiness of
computer records, see supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
152. A distinction should be made between operator inexperience and
irregularity in the preparation of records. The length of ownership of a personal computer should not necessarily be allowed to determine the continuity of its use. Only where output error can be linked to unfamiliarity
with the system should the latter be considered relevant to reliability.
153. See supra note 104.
154. See supra note 81.
155. See supra note 81.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), in conjunction with FRE
Rule 901(b) (9), may allow computer records into evidence
whether or not they qualify as records made in the regular
course of business, if the proponent can demonstrate that reasonable persons in the conduct of serious affairs would rely on
them. 15 6 In substance, FRE 803(24) is a "catch-all" hearsay exception which purports to cover statements that do not fall
squarely within the other recognized exceptions but which carry
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."' 5 7
FRE Rule 803(24) does have its limitations. For example, if the
proponent of computer output can reasonably obtain other evidence more probative on the point in issue, FRE 803(24) (B) will
permit the judge to exclude it. Additionally, FRE 803(24) requires the proponent of the computer record to serve the adverse party with notice of the intention to ask for its
58
admission.
Regularly kept personal records are no longer considered
inadmissible because they are self-serving or because they did
not originate from a traditional business environment. Their
systematic preparation and necessity create a rebuttable presumption of trustworthiness. That presumption is not weakened, and indeed may be strengthened, where the records are
maintained in a personal computer. Therefore, like business or
public records, a presumption of reliability should extend to regularly kept personal computer records.
156. This approach is suggested by Professor Weinstein. See 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 901(b) (9) [02], at 901-113 (citing Sigmon,
Rules of Evidence Before the I.C.C., 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 265 (1962)).
Rule 901(b) (9) is discussed infra at note 185 and accompanying text. Rule

803(24) provides as follows:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if

the court determines that (A) the statements is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet it, his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 803(24).

157. FED. R. Evm. 803(24).
158. Id.
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THE FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMrITING COMPUTER
GENERATED RECORDS

A cursory examination of the cases that have rejected computer generated evidence suggests a common theme: the failure
of its proponent to lay an adequate foundation for its admissibility. 15 9 While the cases state the requirement of an adequate
foundation succinctly, it is difficult to define its specifics. 160 Judicial effort to formulate precise guidelines has generally succeeded in broadening the scope of inquiry into the reliability of
computer output beyond that necessary to determine its
admissibility. 161
Though not the first to consider the admissibility of computer printouts, 162 in King v. ex rel. Murdock Acceptance
Corp., 63 the Supreme Court of Mississippi was the first to outline the elements necessary for an adequate foundation. In an
extension of the common-law "shop-book rule"' 64 the court held
that computer printouts of business records were admissible
provided
(1) the electronic computing equipment is recognized as standard
equipment;
(2)
the entries are made in the regular course of business at or
reasonably near the time of the happening of the event recorded;
and
(3) the foundation testimony satisfies the court that the sources
of information, method and time of preparation were such as to in159. See, e.g., People v. Bovio, 118 Ill.
App. 3d 836, 455 N.E.2d 829 (1983)
(failure to show that computer equipment was standard and how information at data center was processed constituted inadequate foundation for
computerized bank records). But see, e.g., State v. Mach, 23 Wash. App. 113,
594 P.2d 1361 (1979) (holding that even absent technical information, computerized records of an established bank should carry presumption of
reliability).
160. A wide-ranging list of foundation elements distilled from various
cases may be found in Annot., 7 A.L.R. 4th 8, 15 (1980).
161. E.g., Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 156 N.J. Super. 107,
383 A.2d 475 (1977). Monarch is discussed supra at note 10 and infra at
notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
162. One of the earliest cases to deal with the admissibility of computer
printouts was Transportation Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d
871 (1965). In Seib, the court found the voluminous foundation testimony
which indicated the calculations the computer results were based upon had
been manually verified, which presented the accounting manager's detailed
descriptions of the company's accounting procedures and which consumed
over 141 pages of the trial record, was sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of the printouts. Id. at 257, 132 N.W.2d at 873.
163. 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969). In King, computerized accounting
records offered to prove the balance due on various sales contracts were
admitted in light of the computer department supervisor's extensive testimony. Id. at 396.
164. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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165
dicate its trustworthiness and justify its admission.

The King test, however, failed to mark the outer limits of
the required testimony as to the sources of information, method
or time of preparation of computer records. 166 In an effort to
redefine the King standards, the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, in Monarch Federal Savings & Loan
Associationv. Genser,167 proposed a more elaborate set of guidelines. In addition to the requirements of the New Jersey business records exception, 168 the court held the foundation
testimony must include five elements to establish the trustworthiness of a computer generated record:
(1) the competency of the computer operators...
(2) the type of computer used and its acceptance in the field as
standard and efficient equipment...
(3) the procedure for the input and output of information, including controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability...
(4) the mechanical operations of the machine ... and 169
(5) the meaning and identity of the records themselves.
Courts that find foundation testimony inadequate generally
do so because one or more of the foregoing elements are lacking. 170 The King and Monarch guidelines are, however, no
165. King, 222 So. 2d at 396. Compare this test and the requirements of
the UBREA, supra note 110, with FED. R. EVID. 803(6) discussed supra at
notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
166. One commentator has criticized the King requirements because
they did not specify the factors which allegedly diminish the reliability of a
computer's output nor did they indicate what testimony would be sufficient
in future cases. Note, supranote 29, at 85-86. ContraNote, Admissibility of
Computer Kept Business Records, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1033, 1042 (1970).
167. 156 N.J. 107, 383 A.2d 475 (1977).
168. NEW JERSEY EviD. R. 63(13) parallels the UBREA, supra note 110,
but eliminates the requirement that the custodian testify as to the authenticity of the record.
169. Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 156 N.J. 107, 131-32, 383
A.2d 475, 487-88 (1977).
170. This is not to suggest that courts which admit computer generated
evidence do so on the successful application of the Monarch test. Specifically, courts employ the following reasons for not admitting computer
records: (1) no evidence that the computer is recognized as standard,

Grand Liquor Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 67 Ill. 2d 195, 367 N.E.2d

1238 (1977); Vining v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 409 So. 2d 1306 (La. App.
1982); O'Shea v. IBM Corp., 578 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); (2) no evidence that the foundation witness was familiar with the operation of the
computer, Grand Liquor Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 67 Ill. 2d 195,
367 N.E.2d 1238 (1977); (3) no proof as to the accuracy of the printouts or the
safeguards used to ensure reliability, People v. Boyd, 66 Ill. App. 3d 582, 384
N.E.2d 414 (1978); People v. Gauer, 7 Ill. App. 3d 512, 288 N.E.2d 24 (1972);
(4) no evidence as to the sources of information, time, mode or method of
preparation of the printouts, Department of Mental Health v. Beil, 44 II.

App. 3d, 402, 357 N.E.2d 875 (1976); People v. Gauer, 7 Ill. App. 3d 512, 288

N.E.2d 24 (1972); Vining v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 409 So. 2d 1306 (La. App.
1982); Hamilton Music Inc. v. York, 565 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. App. 1978); and
(5) no evidence of the meaning of the printouts, Estate of Buddeke v. Mac-
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longer appropriate for various reasons. The elements are meaningless in the context of modem computer technology. They are
predicated on false assumptions concerning the reliability of
computers, and they are directly in opposition to the rationale
supporting the business and public records exceptions to the
hearsay rule.171

Whether the computer operator was competent is only relevant to the extent that specific proof demonstrates incompeThe rationale underlying the business records
tency. 172
exception presumes that the competent performance of employees is a condition to their continued employment.1 73 To ignore
this concept merely because the records are processed by a
computer thrusts an artificial and unnecessary requirement of
additional circumstantial reliability upon them.
The requirement that the computer must be standard is
1 74
meaningless in the context of modern computer technology.
Recent publications covering available computer hardware reveal that variety is the only standard in the industry. 75 Satisfying this requirement cannot increase the probability that the
record is accurate.
Like evidence of operator competency, credible testimony
as to the use of controls, tests and checks for computer accuracy
and reliability is necessary to determine printout admissibility
Neal Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 49 Ill.
App. 3d 431, 364 N.E.2d 446 (1977); People
v. Gauer, 7 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 288 N.E.2d 24 (1972). More Illinois decisions have
excluded computer printouts than any other jurisdiction. This is particularly odd given the plain language of the business records exceptions in Illinois. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
171. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Hogan, 7
Mass. App. Ct. 236, 387 N.E.2d 158, affd, 379 Mass. 190, 396 N.E.2d 978 (1979),
firmly rejected the requirement of additional foundation testimony. There
the court said:
[W]e do not believe it necessary to determine whether a special foundation requirement such as that suggested in United States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889, 893 n.11 (9th Cir. 1969), should be imposed on
business records stored in a computer. In that case the court stated
that the offeror should present evidence of the trustworthiness of the
computerized information but noted that 'everyday reliance on the information was an adequate indicium of trustworthiness'.. . . If the opponent of computer evidence challenges it on the basis of, for example,
the mechanical accuracy of the computer, it remains within the court's
discretion... to require the provision of additional foundation
testimony.

Id at 244, n.15, 387 N.E.2d at 168, n.15.
172. See FED. R. EviD.803(6), supra note 93.

173. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
174. "The failure to certify the brand or proper operating condition of [a

computer] does not betray a circumstance of preparation indicating any
lack of trustworthiness." United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (1982).
175. See authorities cited supranote 1.
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only to the extent that other credible testimony proves their defective use or nonexistence. 176 This applies with equal force to
evidence of mechanical operation. 177 Modern computerized record systems exhibit error rates far lower than those experienced
with conventional techniques. 178 There is no sound reason in
science or law for such additional circumstantial guarantees.
Evidence of the meaning and identity of computer output is
critical to its probative value. 179 Where such proof is totally
lacking, the court should refuse to admit the computer
records. 180 This should not be misread, however, to require
more than testimony to show the record is what its proponent
claims.' 8 '
The Requirement of Authentication and Identification
The authentication and identification of a writing as a prerequisite to its admission is recognized. 182 From the outset, it is
important to understand that the concept of authentication is an
extension of the rules of relevancy. 183 Where authentication is
established, it cannot substitute for the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness required to negate the hearsay rule. Nor
can its requirement be employed to insist upon proof of trustworthiness in addition to the elements of the hearsay
84
exception.
Federal Rule of Evidence 901 covers the authentication and
identification of business records. 85 Simply stated, the rule re176. See supra note 104.
177. See supra note 104.
178. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.

179. The concept of identification is discussed briefly infra at notes 182-87
and accompanying text.
180. On the inadmissibility of evidence which lacks probative weight altogether, see MCCORMICK, supra note 46, §§ 51-60, at 109-38. See also Huber,
Hunt and Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1977)

(printout held inadmissible where confusion outweighed probative value).
181. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
182. See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 46, §§ 218-28, at 543-58; 7 WIG-

supra note 46, §§ 2128-2169, at 562-665.
183. Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, supra note 74, at
335-36. (FED. R. Evm. 901(a)).
184. See supra note 93.
MORE,

185.

FED.

R. EviD. 901.

Requirement of Authentication or Identification
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.
(b) Illustration. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
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quires nothing more than evidence that the record is what its
proponent claims. 1 86 The rule illustrates that, where computer

records are offered sufficient evidence of authentication may include "evidence describing a process or system used to produce
a result and showing that the process or system produces an ac87
curate result.'
One commentator has suggested that FRE 901 does not provide an adequate foundation for the authentication and identifi-

cation of computer generated evidence. 188 Despite contrary
language in the rule, the commentator apparently believed a
computer record could only be authenticated by evidence demonstrating the accuracy and reliability of the system that produced the records. 18 9 Accordingly, a new Rule 901(c) was
proposed to ensure these requirements are met. 190
The proposed rule, however, incorporates the shortcomings
of other foundation requirements for computer records that the
courts have occasionally required. 191 It insists upon guarantees
of circumstantial reliability contrary to the plain language and
meaning of Rule 901.192 It also confuses the purposes of authentication which concerns relevancy with the assurances neces(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system
used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.
Id.
186. Id.
187. But see Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Evidence, 56

F.R.D. 183, 336 (1972) (noting that "Example (9) does not, of course, foreclose taking judicial notice of accuracy of the process or system."). Given
the reliability of today's computers, this is the more reasonable solution.
See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 196-204
and accompanying text.
188. Singer, supra note 11, at 167-76.
189. Id. at 174. Rule 901 makes clear that subsection (9) is illustrative
only, not directory. The requirement may, therefore, be satisfied by other
means. See supra note 187.
190. Proposed Rule 901(c) Computer Program or System. Evidence
describing a computer program or system of computer programs used
to produce a result and showing by a description of the computer hardware, programming method, stored data base, operation of the system,
system security, and specific application controls, that the program or
system produces an accurate result, satisfies the authentication requirement for a computer programmer or system. Voluminous testimony should not be required to lay a foundation for the computer
system or process. For instance, the explanation of the computer hardware need not be more than an overview by the manufacturer of the
central processing unit and of the types of input/output devices used
by the system.
Singer, supra note 11, at 174.
191. Compare Singer, supra note 11, at 174 with note 170 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 185.
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sary to obviate the hearsay rule. 193
Federal Rule of Evidence 901, in its present form, is the most
acceptable authentication requirement. As a practical matter,
liberalized discovery rules will resolve the necessity of all but
the most elemental requirement of identification in open
court. 94 Further, to satisfy the authentication requirement a
court can take judicial notice of the fact that computers regu195
larly produce accurate results.
JudicialNotice
It is a fundamental principle of law that "the doctrine of judicial notice is one of common sense." 196 When applied, its practical effect is to remove the necessity of proof of the fact
noticed. 19 Matters of common knowledge, as well as a long list
of discoveries, inventions, and common mechanical devices
have been consistently recognized as proper subjects for judicial notice. 198 The computer has now become so widely relied
upon and accepted that it is a viable candidate for addition to
that list. 99
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs judicial
notice of adjudicative facts. 20 0 Essentially, the rule provides
that judicial notice may be taken of a fact if it is either "(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court
193. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
194. 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 901(b)(9)[02], at 901-110 901-114.
195. See supra note 187. See also infra notes 196-204 and accompanying

text.
196. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 328, at 757 n.2 (quoting Harper v. Killion, 162 Tex. 481, 348 S.W.2d 521 (1961)).
197. See generally 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 200[05], at

200-24 - 200-28.
198. The list includes, among other things, airplanes, air conditioners, bicycles, locomotives, gasoline engines, motorboats, motorcycles, washing
machines, watches, telephones, radios, refrigerators, sewing machines, and
typewriters. 31 A.C.J.S. Evidence § 81, at 98, 99-108 (1955). Although judicial

notice is generally taken of the reliability of speed measuring devices, one
commentator has noted that moving radar devices which combine the Doppler principle with computer technology raise issues pertinent to the admissibility of computer generated evidence. Dixon, Moving Radar,ILL. MUNC.
REV. 24 (Dec. 1983).

199. Judicial notice may be taken of the nature and manner of use of
devices applying fundamentally known principles. In this age of rapid
technological advance contrivances which a few years ago would have

been considered novel in design or application have become commonplace and the accuracy of their product is generally recognized. For example, computer printouts are received in evidence in civil and
criminal cases as a matter of course.
United States v. Foster, 580 F.2d 388, 390 (10th Cir. 1978).
200. FED. R. Evm. 201.
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or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
'20 1
sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.
Of course, whether a court will take notice of any fact is within
20 2
its broad discretion.
The suggestion that computers are a proper subject for judicial notice is not offered as an alternative to proving the credibility or ultimate accuracy of the evidence they generate.2 0 3 The
proponent must establish only circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness to admit hearsay. 2° 4 Upon a showing that the
computer record qualifies as a business, public or personal record, judicial notice can be taken of its presumable reliability
and, absent specific contrary proof, form the basis for its
admissibility.
The Foundation Witness
Finally, only a proper witness can authenticate the computer record and establish the elements of the relevant hearsay
exception. Whether a computer record is admissible depends
upon the testimony of the foundation witness. 20 5 Therefore, the
proponent of such evidence, to adequately prepare for trial,
must know that the witness called to introduce the record is
competent to lay the required foundation.
Concrete rules are difficult to extract from the cases. Much
depends, of course, on the necessary foundational elements.
For example, a bookkeeper who supervises the regular preparation of computerized payroll records, but who is neither a computer technician or a programmer, cannot vouch for the
mechanical reliability of either the machine itself or its
201. Id.
202. The title of FED. R. Evw. 201(d), "when mandatory," would appear
to define a situation in which judicial notice would no longer be considered
discretionary. A close reading of this subsection reveals, however, that
Congress directed that the court "shall" [not must] take judicial notice of a
fact and then, only if a party so requests and provides information the court
deems necessary to demonstrate widespread acceptance. Id.
203. "Even when admitted as business records, however, computer data
acquires reliability as evidence from the system under which it is produced.
If the original data fed in is not accurate, or if the machine and its program
are not well designed and operated or if the data produced is not properly
evaluated, it has no reliable probative force." 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,

supra note 42, § 901(b) (9) [02], at 901-113.
204. See supra note 77.

205. But see People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Barrett by Bortman, 118 Ill.
App. 3d 52, 454 N.E.2d 713 (1983) (accuracy of computer printouts proved by

affidavit). As to the witnesses that may be called to establish admissibility
of regularly kept records, see generally 5 WIGMoRE, supranote 46, § 1530, at

449-61; MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 312, at 729-30, Laughlin, supra note 80,

at 294-96.
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software. 206 Conversely, a computer programmer cannot always
attest to the competency of the computer operators or that the
records are regularly kept. 20 7 Where the foundation requires
testimony as to the reliability of the computer and its software,
the competency of the computer operators and the regularity of
the process, the proponent faces a difficult choice. Under such
an approach, the foundation witness must be both a computer
expert and the custodian of the records or the proponent must
20 8
call different witnesses for each element of the foundation.
A more reasonable result is possible. First, most jurisdictions no longer adhere to the common law requirement that everyone who assisted in the preparation of the records must either
testify as to their contribution to the process or be established
as unavailable. 20 9 Nor is the foundation witness generally required to have personal knowledge of the facts contained in the
record. 210 Thus, an objection that the foundation witness did not
prepare the computer record or lacks personal knowledge of the
facts therein should not affect its admissibility.
Second, expert testimony as to the reliability of the programs the computer uses or other technical aspects of its operation is unnecessary to find computer generated records
circumstantially reliable. 2 11 A contrary rule imposes too great a
burden on those who rely on computer records. 2 12 Given the vol206. E.g., People v. Boyd, 66 Ill. App. 3d 582, 384 N.E.2d 414 (1978) (computerized payroll records held inadmissible where bookkeeper could not
testify that computer was standard or properly operating).
207. E.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 468 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971) (expert in computerized cost analysis could not establish
proper foundation because he was not the custodian of the records).
208. Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 156 N.J. Super. 107, 383
A.2d 475 (1977). The Monarch court explained that "expertise in computers

or setting up the particular program" was not required to establish an adequate foundation. Id. at 134, 383 A.2d at 489. Then the court held the records
inadmissible because the witness
did not provide information on the type of computer used and its acdid not
ceptance in the field as standard and accurate equipment ....
testify as to the competency of those who program the computer and
process the daily input, nor did he fully explain the input controls or
the mechanics of the machine.
Id. No one but a computer expert could satisfy the foregoing requirements.
209. E.g., Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir. 1980); United

States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1975). Professor McCormick
notes that virtually every statutory business records exception now rejects
such a requirement. McCoamicx, supranote 46, § 312, at 729-30.
210. See supra note 209.
211. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.

212. A significant problem arises where the central computer is located
apart from the place where the records are regularly maintained and relied
upon. For example, a number of businesses utilize a data center to process
their records. See People v. Bovio, 118 Ill. App. 3d 836, 455 N.E.2d 829 (1983)
(banking); Record Data, Inc. v. Vinylgrain Ind. of Georgia, Inc., 143 Ga. App.
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atility of hardware and software markets, no computer user
could ever be certain that a qualified manufacturer's representative or other competent expert would be available to certify the
reliability of the particular system used.213 Moreover, because
the software and hardware that comprise many modern computer systems are often manufactured by different companies,
additional problems might be encountered in obtaining different
experts to establish the reliability of each piece. 2 14 The admissibility of regularly kept computer records would turn on the proponent's financial resources and the availability of a variety of
experts, rather than the time-tested rules governing the admission of regularly maintained records.
A witness is competent to lay the foundation for systematically prepared computer records if the witness can demonstrate
to the court that the computer record is what its proponent
claims 215 and is sufficiently familiar with the record system used
to satisfy the court that the record qualifies as a proper business, public, or personal record. 216 Thus, company officers, supervisors of accounting departments, assistant bank cashiers,
record custodians and even data entry clerks, whether or not
they are computer experts, may establish the necessary foundation.217 This approach is consistent with the reasons underlying
854, 240 S.E.2d 223 (1977) (account for services). Others rely on telecommunication networks to link remote input terminals to the central processing
unit. See United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977) (computer
retrieval system); People v. Mormon, 97 Ill. App. 3d 556, 422 N.E.2d 1065,

affd, 92 Ill. 2d 268, 442 N.E.2d 250 (1981) (Avis Corporation). In these situations, the custodian of the records will usually be able to describe the systematic preparation of the records, their meaning and identity and the
degree to which they are relied upon. The witness will not, however, be

able to say what brand of computer or software the data center uses, nor
will the witness be able to vouch for the reliability of the technical aspects
of their operation. People v. Bovio, 118 Ill. App. 3d 836, 839, 455 N.E.2d 829,
831 (1983). To reject regularly maintained computer records on that basis
alone arguably exhalts form far above substance. It can also be contended
that such a rule unfairly discriminates against computer users who cannot
afford to own a computer system themselves.
213. See generally authorities cited supra notes 1 and 4.
214. See generally authorities cited supra notes 1 and 4.
215. FED. R. EviD. 901. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 93, 122 and 150. The witness is not required to have
been the custodian at the time the records were made. Bobbie Brooks, Inc.
v. Hyatt, 195 Neb. 596, 239 N.W.2d 782 (1976).
217. Computer records were admissible in the following cases even
though the foundation witness was not a computer expert: United States v.
Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982) (telephone company employee); Rosenberg
v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980) (company comptroller); United States
v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629 (1968) (assistant bank cashier), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1014 (1969); American Oil Co. v. Valenti, 179 Conn. 349, 426
A.2d 305 (1980) (sales manager); Reisman v. Martori, Meyer, Hendricks &
Victor, 155 Ga. App. 551, 271 S.E.2d 685 (1980) (president of lawyer's association); Brown v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1969) (telephone corn-
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the business and public records exceptions to the hearsay
2 18
rule.
CONCLUSION

Computer generated records, systematically prepared and
maintained, carry a presumption of circumstantial reliability.
Thus, they should be admissible in evidence to prove the truth
of the matters asserted therein, unless other circumstances
demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness. Those who rely on
widely accepted scientific principles to conduct their daily affairs should not be required to reestablish those principles
every time they become the subject of litigation.
The failure of a number of courts to recognize a distinction
between proving the accuracy of computer output and merely
establishing its circumstantial reliability has set a questionable
precedent for admitting computer records in those jurisdictions.
Requiring an extensive and technical foundation as a prerequisite to admissibility only perpetuates the judicial myth that electronic record systems are inherently less trustworthy than
conventional systems. It increases the complexity of trials and
diminishes efficiency in judicial rulings on admissibility. It also
unfairly burdens the proponent of a computer record. For instance, due to the affordability and ease of operation of
microcomputers, small businesses and individuals can now
computerize their records. It would be ironic if the same lack of
financial resources and technological expertise which long kept
the computer beyond reach would now determine the admissibility of their computerized records.
The courts that distrust computer evidence can avoid such a
harsh result by reexamining the erroneous assumptions on
which this "presumption of unreliability" is based. The controls,
checks and tests which virtually every piece of computer hardware and every software package now incorporate should not
become worthless the moment the recordkeeper steps into the
courtroom. Nor should the court ignore the assurances of reliability that surround regularly prepared records simply because
they are maintained by a computer. Courts should take judicial
notice that regularly kept computer records are ordinarily reliapany district account supervisor); People v. Mormon, 97 Ill. App. 3d 556, 422
N.E.2d 1065 (1981) (Avis security manager); State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d

421 (La. 1975) (comptroller-office manager); Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Hyatt,
195 Neb. 596, 239 N.W.2d 782 (1976) (records custodian); State v. Passmore,
37 N.C. App. 5, 245 S.E.2d 107, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 556, 248 S.E.2d 734 (1978)

(bank's assistant operations officer).
218. See supra notes 88 and 124 and accompanying text.
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ble and require specific, supported objections to show any deficiency in the record-keeping process. Given that the
widespread use of computer records in litigation is inevitable,
this approach will ensure that their admissibility is based on circumstantial guarantees, while proof of their ultimate accuracy is
reserved for the trier of fact.
Peter M. Storm

